




Producer cooperatives, institutional change and politics in the wine industry, 1880-
1980.1 
Eva Fernández and James Simpson (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid) 
Producer cooperatives in most branches of agriculture were still rare in the 
1930s, but relatively common by the end of the twentieth century.2 In the wine industry 
there were virtually none in France, Italy and Spain in 1900, but a century later they 
accounted for at least half of the national production in the first two countries, and 70 
per cent in Spain. This paper looks at two very different explanations for this change. In 
the first instance we look at cooperatives from an organizational perspective, where they 
combined the low supervision and monitoring costs associated with the family farm 
with the growing economies of scale found in the new food processing technologies, 
and their considerably greater market power in their negotiations with up and 
downstream trading partners. The second approach looks at cooperatives as marketing 
associations used by the state to help stabilize markets by storing surplus produce. This 
paper argues that the initial slow diffusion of wine cooperatives was caused by a lack of 
cheap credit and high transaction costs which both limited the potential for improving 
product quality and selling wine collectively. The movement only become widespread 
from the 1930s in France, and the 1950s in Spain, when the state offered cooperatives 
incentives to store surplus wine which helped compensate for the high costs associated 
with collective action.   
European wine producers faced considerable income variability across years. 
This in part was the result of significant fluctuations in the yield and quality of grapes 
on each plot of land, caused by a large number of uncontrollable variables, such as 
weather (rainfall, mean daily temperatures, hail, frosts, etc.), pests and vine diseases. 
Traditionally, growers responded by planting different grape varieties, each with 
distinct levels of tolerance to these problems. Another factor was that supply was 
relatively inelastic because of the high costs in establishing vineyards, as growers were 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Paper prepared for IV Workshop ‘Cooperación y conflicto en el mundo rural’. Estado y agricultura en 
España (1920-1960): continuidad y cambios. Please do not cite.  
2 The literature on the early European farm cooperatives is very large. See especially Beltrán-Tapia, 2012, 





reluctant to uproot vines during prices slumps which they believed were only 
temporary. Finally, local market conditions were increasingly affected by the size of 
harvests in other producing regions as both domestic and international markets became 
more integrated. Merchants bought small quantities of wine with very different 
characteristics from a very large number of producers to blend and sell to consumers. 
As per capita consumption began to stagnate and then fall in producer countries from 
around the Second World War and export possibilities were limited, merchants were 
able to push the cost of adjustment to producers.   
The paper is divided into four sections. The first argues that the success of wine 
cooperatives was limited before 1930 in France and 1950 in Spain because of the lack 
of cheap credit and the high transaction costs in establishing and operating them. 
Incentives to join a cooperative were also low because of their inability to influence 
market prices. Section two looks at the problems facing cooperatives in restricting 
supply to raise prices, and the success of some New World producers in creating cartels. 
Section three shows that although the high transaction costs associated with 
cooperatives continued after the 1930s, incentives to join increased with the growing 
regulation of the industry by the state, which now granted aid to growers not only for 
the construction of new facilities but also for the blocking of wines in periods of low 
prices. Subsidies were also made available for the distillation of surplus wine, another 
major incentive given that it allowed growers to remove surpluses for which their 
wineries lacked sufficient capacity. The final section argues that while cooperatives 
helped reduce the cyclical problems facing the industry, they created new incentives for 
producers which discouraged them to adapt to the major demand changes taking place 
towards the end of the twentieth century.  While wine cooperatives were originally 
conceived as a means of improving product quality and reducing merchants’ market 
power, they now became seen as the main source of poor quality wines and 
governments were forced to look to other institutions to improve product quality and 





1. The family vineyard and wine cooperative before the Second World War 
 
Although one or two wine cooperatives existed briefly in the 1890s, the 
movement only began in earnest in southern France during the crisis of overproduction 
at the turn of the twentieth century, the so called filles de la misère.3 Between 1863-75 
and 1879-92 French wine output fell by 40 per cent on account of phylloxera which 
devastated vineyards.4 Wine prices soared, and farmers in neighbouring countries such 
as Algeria, Italy and Spain increased supply by planting more vines. As French growers 
learnt to use phylloxera-resistant vines, domestic output recovered leading to 
overproduction and the crise de mévente, forcing producers in the important and worse 
hit Midi region to sell their wine at cost or below in five of the seven harvests between 
1900 and 1906.5 The massive demonstrations in this region marked a turning point for 
the industry for two reasons. First, the inelastic demand for wine and new production 
technologies now led to oversupply and the periodic collapses in prices as the industry 
slipped from ‘one crisis to the next’, namely in the periods 1900-7, 1917-25; 1928-37, 
etc.) (Figure 1).6 The demonstrations also led to a new relationship between farm 
groups and the state, as the government set a precedent by granting legal powers to a 
producers’ association (the Confédération Générale des Vignerons du Midi  -CGV) to 
monitor the industry itself, in this case by guaranteeing that members respected laws on 
adulterated wines. This type of alliance was the model for future joint action between 
the state and the sector.  
Faced with this collapse in wine prices, a number of influential French writers 
including Charles Gide, Augé-Laribé and Adrien Berget proposed the creation of wine 
cooperatives.7 The rapid post-phylloxera reconstruction in the Midi had not only seen a 
doubling of the area of vines, but also a ‘flight’ away from the hills (and low yield 
varieties) to the fertile plains, where growers used irrigation, fertilisers, and chemicals 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3  In 1890 one was established in Barberá (Tarragona) and in 1893 in the Champagne region. Clique, 
1931, p.14. 
4  Calculated from Lachiver, 1988, pp.582-3. 
5  Warner, 1960, p.18.  
6  It was made worse by the fact that growers were reluctant to uproot vines after just a few years of low 
prices because of the high capital costs in establishing a vineyard.  





to produce large quantities of very poor wine. Growers in their rush to expand the area 
under vines had insufficient capital to also build cellars and storage capacity, and the 
wines therefore had to be sold immediately after crushing (vins non-logés).8 
Theoretically, by combining resources, a hundred or two family grape producers could 
build and equip a large winery to cut production costs, pay for a skilled oenologist to 
improve quality, and store wines cheaply to be sold later in the year at higher prices.9 
Wine cooperatives could also process the remains of the grapes (marc) to make alcohol 
and tartaric acid. Finally they could act as banks, providing loans to their members. 
Yet despite the considerable early interest there were still only 92 cooperatives 
in France in 1920. Wine prices, which fell once more by 70 per cent in real terms 
between 1917 and 1925, sparked a renewal of interest and numbers reached 353 by 
1927, most of them located in the Midi,10 and they continued rising during the 1930s 
crisis (Table 1). By contrast the growth of wine cooperatives in Spain before 1930 was 
limited. Although the government introduced important fiscal incentives for agricultural 
cooperatives with the law of 1906 (Ley de Sindicatos Agrarios),11 and there were 88 
wine cooperatives in the early 1920s, little different to the 92 found in France, but then 
the rate of growth slow considerably, and numbers were little different on the eve of the 




The fact that farm cooperatives were more widespread in some institutional 
settings (such as the nature of the commodity, region, and historical period) than others 
has produced a large literature, with economic historians citing exogenous restrictions 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8  Mandeville (1914: 43), See also Cot (1900) cited in Gervais, 1913, p.50.   
9  There was an average of 160 members in the 21 cooperatives that had been created between 1903 and 
1910, and each produced on average 50 hectolitres of wine in 1913, the equivalent to about a hectare of 
vines. Simpson, 2011, pp.72-3, calculated from Mandeville, 1914, tables 1 and 2.  
10  Warner (1960). Between 1919 and 1929 some 108 cooperatives were created in the Midi, Galtier 
(1958: 338). 





to their growth such as weak capital markets; political opposition from private 
producers; or the lack of government commitment.12 Endogenous factors, which 
increased transaction costs and made cooperatives less competitive than private 
companies were also frequent. In the period prior to the 1930s, there were three major 
factors which can help explain the slow growth of wine cooperatives in France and 
Spain: capital constraints for constructing the wineries; the high transaction costs in 
their operation; and the inability of a cooperative to influence wine prices. 
The lack of capital to establish the new winery was perhaps the most common 
complaint among contemporaries. In France, the original 1884 law on association was 
followed by those of 1906 and 1907, which allowed wine cooperatives access to long 
term credit at the almost uniform rate of 2 per cent interest over 25 years.13 Between 
1907 and 1914 around 50 cooperatives in southern France obtained loans covering an 
average of 47 per cent of their capital costs, and the state gave subsidies of 815 
thousand francs, or an additional 14 per cent.14 By contrast in Spain the attempts by the 
Marqués de Camps in 1914 to pass a law that would have seen the state advance 10 per 
cent of the costs of the winery failed.15  Instead small growers in Utiel (Valencia) had to 
wait 22 years to build their winery, while those of neighbouring Requena built it 
themselves over a three year period.16  
A second factor was the high transaction costs associated with wine production.  
In Europe weather conditions vary significantly from one year to the next and growers 
planted a number of grape varieties to reduce the risks of losing their entire crop, as the 
vulnerabilities of each variety differed.17 They also mixed shy-bearers, which in general 
produced better quality wines, with others that increased the volume. As grapes often 
became diseased, damaged by inclement weather, or unripe because they had been 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12  For a theoretical description of farm cooperatives from an organizational economic perspective, see 
especially Valentinov, 2006. 
13  Caupert, 1921, p.111, Gervais, 1913 and Mandeville, 1914, pp.2 and 11. Capital was provided by the 
state, but lent through regional credit banks, which were responsible for the loans. Transaction costs were 
greatly reduced because cooperatives were required to establish a specific legal structure if they wished to 
receive loans.  
14  Mandeville, 1914, p.139. 
15  Torrejon y Bonete, 1923, p.52. The loan was to be paid over 30 years with an annual interest of 3 per 
cent. 
16  Piqueras, 1981, p.270. 





collected too early in an effort to reduce these problems, or overripe to maximize sugar 
content (and hence the alcoholic strength of the wine), it was difficult for growers to 
establish contracts to sell them to wineries. The result was that virtually all Europe’s 
non-premium wines were made by the growers, and then sold to merchants who 
blended them to meet consumers demand in terms of price and taste. Cooperatives from 
the turn of the twentieth century offered the potential to make both better and cheaper 
wine, because of the economies of scale available with the new wine-making equipment 
and better designed cellars, and their ability to hire oenologists who had a greater 
scientific appreciation of what led to wines deteriorating. Wholesale merchants faced 
much lower costs when buying from one or two big wineries rather than having to 
collect from a large numbers of different growers scattered over a wide territory, and 
transportation costs were lower when wines were shipped in bulk.  
Yet most early cooperatives failed to improve quality as Charles Gide in 
particular had hoped. This was because the cost of sorting each basket to measure grape 
quality was high, so cooperative could pay only by weight and sugar content, a proxy 
for the future wine’s alcoholic strength.18 However this failed to differentiate between 
good and bad grapes. To placate growers, some initially allowed their members to sell 
privately part of their harvest, which resulted in the cooperatives receiving only the poor 
grapes that could not be sold elsewhere.19 By contrast, when cooperatives forced their 
members to hand over all the harvest, the economic incentive for growers was to uproot 
their quality shy-bearers, and plant heavy-bearers. In both cases the end result was that 
cooperatives received poor grapes, leading to the production of low quality wines. In 
this respect the combination of a hot climate and limited number of varieties, both 
factors which reduce grape heterogeneity, help explain why 72 per cent of French 
cooperatives were found in the south (Languedoc-Roussillon and the Lower Rhone) in 
the early 1950s.20 Only in Burgundy did cooperatives actually improve wine quality 
before the Second World War. Here the considerable prices paid for a premium wine 
compensated the cooperative for the high monitoring costs associated with a strict 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18  For a contemporary discussion on how cooperatives paid for grapes, see Torrejon, 1923, pp.29-40. 
19  See Henriksen, Hviid and Sharp, 2012. 
20  B’OIV, 1954, no. 283, pp.46-7. These were not the only factors, and the region’s militant tradition in 





control of vineyard practices and an exhaustive control of which grapes were used in 
wine making.21  
Finally, the early cooperatives also had difficulties in selling directly to 
consumers, because market fluctuations made it difficult for cooperative members to 
determine whether the prices negotiated were fair, or whether those involved in the sale 
had cheated. The result was that some cooperatives limited themselves to making wine, 
and left the sale to individual members, rather than experience a poor sale which might 
discredit the management.22 
 
2. The early cooperatives and limits to market intervention  
Between 1914 and 1939 the plight of many of the world’s farmers was 
exceptional, as world wheat production grew twice as fast as consumption, and nominal 
prices for US corn, French wheat, and Japanese rice declined by 50 per cent.23  Trends 
in wine markets were similar, although the difficulties in measuring changes in product 
quality make it harder to show the extent of the downturn (Figure 1). While European 
farmers’ demands in the late nineteenth century could often be met by raising tariffs, 
this was now insufficient as domestic production was often in excess of demand, and 
export opportunities were strictly limited. Instead, following the successful market 
intervention by some governments during the First World War, farm lobbies looked to 
the state once more to help resolve problems of low farm gate prices and persistent 
surpluses. In their study of institutional choice in US agriculture during the 1920s, 
Hoffman and Libecap argued that the federal government faced a choice of either 
supporting private cooperative organizations or intervene itself directly to limit supplies 
to raise prices. It chose to support private cooperatives when ‘crop-specific 
characteristics’ and the broader market conditions permitted. These they argue, required 
among other factors there to be relatively few producers; product quality was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21  Clique, 1931, pp.21-60. See also a similar example with the Alella Vinicola cooperative in Barcelona. 
Torrejon, 1923, pp.34-40. 
22  Mandeville, 1914, pp.111-12 and Clique, 1931, p.187. 





homogenous; new entry was difficult (both nationally and internationally); commodities 
were perishable, making it difficult to accumulate stocks; and prices could be raised 
with only small production cuts.24 
Not one of these five conditions were to be found with European wine 
production, suggesting that cooperative marketing associations faced serious difficulties 
to restrict wine supplies (Table 3). In France in the 1930s there were around 1.5 million 
producers.25 Quality varied significantly, not just between fine vintage wines and cheap 
blending ones, but also between common wines in neighbouring regions, or on a single 
plot from one year to the next. There were also abundant supplies of potentially suitable 
land and qualified labour to increase output by new plantings when prices recovered.26 
The effects of higher wine prices on supply might be limited in the short term as new 
vines took four years to become productive, but in the medium and long terms it was 
strong because their commercial life was around forty years. Therefore new vineyards 
often came into production when the market had already peaked.27 Furthermore, given 
the high capital costs of planting vineyards, growers were reluctant to uproot vines 
during market downturns, and instead used their labour for other activities. Better wine-
making processes and the extensive use of chemicals also allowed stocks to accumulate, 
while distilling was unprofitable by 1900 because of competition from ‘industrial 
alcohol’ produced from potatoes, sugar beet and other vegetable matter.28 Production 
conditions in Europe therefore made it impossible for private companies or 
cooperatives, which rarely produced more than 10,000 hectolitres – the equivalent to 
significantly less than 0.1 per cent of national production, to limit supplies and raise 
prices. Furthermore, voluntary agreements between cooperatives were impossible, in 
part because they controlled too little wine (Table 2), but also because they risked 
failure because of the free-rider problem, given that the difficulties to monitor and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24  Hoffman and Lipecap, 1991, pp-399-400. They show that private cooperatives in the US were 
particularly strong with citrus fruit and milk. See also Boughner and Sumner (2000). 
25  Lachiver, 582-3. The figure was still 1.3 million as late as 1963, but only 54 per cent sold their wine, 
and less than two out five were employed full time (or nearly full time) (Loubère, 1990), p.71. 
26  The area of vine in France in 1935 was 1.65 million hectares, against the peak of 2.47 million in 1874. 
In Spain it probably peaked in the 1880s. Simpson, 1985 and Pan-Montojo, 1994. 
27  By contrast the supply elasticity of artificial or chemical wines was very high, as shown by the 
complaints in the Midi in the early 1900s. Sempé, 1898 and Gide, 1907. 





enforce agreements would encourage members to cheat on one another, while if prices 
did rise, growers from outside the cooperative would feel free to increase output. 
Table 2 
However conditions in the New World wine industry were very different and 
attempts were made by producers to control the significant market volatility that the 
industry experienced from the end of the nineteenth century.29 They also provided 
important lessons for European producers, not just to understand the obstacles to 
creating an effective cartel, but also how the state could resolve many of the problems. 
New World growers enjoyed excellent climatic conditions allowing them to 
produce both high quality and homogenous grapes from over large areas of vines, and 
from one year to the next. Unlike Europe, where the diversity of vine varieties and 
grape quality required that the viticulture and viniculture activities be integrated on the 
family farm (and needing thousands of independent merchants to blend the wines), in 
the New World the two occupations were often carried out by separate businesses, so 
that producers could benefit from the growing economies of scale found in wine-
making. In Mendoza for example, as early as 1903 ten wineries accounted for a third of 
Argentina’s output, with the largest having production facilities of over 90,000 
hectolitres, compared to an average capacity of between 11 and 13 hectolitres in the 
Midi’s cooperatives a decade later.30 The market power of the large producers in 
Mendoza and California was strengthened by import tariffs and the considerable 
distances separating them from their major markets, encouraging them to integrate 
forwards into wholesaling, and to create cartels.  
In California the leading San Francisco merchants created the California Wine 
Association (CWA) in 1894 which sold around 80 per cent of the State’s wine. It owned 
large wine making and storage facilities, and from the turn of the century sold wines 
under its own brand names. The CWA was a trust rather than a cooperative, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29  For a more detailed description, see (Simpson, 2011) and (Simpson, 2011b). 
30  Simpson, 2011, pp.48, 72-3. The dry atmosphere of Mendoza allowed ripe grapes to remain on the 
vines for as long as three months, so that the fixed costs of the winery were spread over a much larger 





successfully restricted supplies to raise prices, especially in the early 1900s.31 In 
Mendoza the leading producers also attempted to organize collectively and created what 
they described as a ‘cooperative’.32  Product quality was notoriously low, and the cartel 
faced the classic free-rider problem of outside producers increasing output in response 
to higher prices. As the leading producers had close ties with local politicians, these 
passed a State law in 1916 that not only allowed public funds to be used to support 
prices by distilling surpluses, but also levied a punitive tax on the production of those 
growers who remained outside the scheme and were potential free-riders.33 In Mendoza 
and California the political climate at the turn of the twentieth century was relatively 
permissive to big business and trusts, and both regions produced around 95 per cent of 
domestic wine output, but had less than 5 per cent of their nation’s population. By while 
annual per capita wine consumption in the US was just 2.4 litres in Argentina it was 50 
litres, and the political costs in terms of consumer discontent and lost votes for national 
politicians in Argentina from allowing a small group of producers’ a monopoly and 
forcing consumers to pay high prices for a basic necessity were considerably greater. In 
the event the Argentina’s Supreme Court declared that provincial governments could 
not create private monopolies. 34  
These two New World experiences were followed with interest in France, and a 
couple of ambitious attempts were made in 1905 and 1907 in the Midi to create 
marketing boards. The aim was to attract sufficient members so that at times of 
overproduction, they would be able to absorb the costs of removing surplus wine from 
the market to support prices.35 The proposals failed, in part because banks were 
unwilling to back the schemes, but also because many growers would have remained 
outside the associations, and would have benefited from any price rises without having 
to contribute to the costs of market support.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31  For the CWA see especially Peninou and  Unzelman , 2000, and Simpson, 2011, pp.204-19. 
32  Attempts by family grape growers to create cooperatives had limited success, not because of the 
‘excessive individualism’ of growers as the director of the Social Museum in Paris believed, but rather 
the opposition of large wine makers. Mateu, 2007, p.15 and Simpson, 2011, p.253 
33  Mateu 2007 p.16 
34  If this had failed it seems likely that politicians in Buenos Aires would have flooded the market with 
cheap imports. 






3. Cooperatives and market intervention: from the 1930s to 1980s 
The growing weakness of farmers’ bargaining power in the market by the turn of 
the twentieth century was accompanied by a significant increase in their organizational 
strength and political influence.  The farm sector in the 1930s still accounted for around 
a third of the active population in industrial economies such as Germany and France, 
and half in Italy and Spain. Politicians both in democratic and authoritarian regimes 
could not ignore the sector. Yet there were limits to the extent that agriculture could 
‘capture’ the state. The sector is highly diverse, and demands from different groups 
might be diametrically opposed to each other (livestock producers, unlike cereal 
farmers, wanted cheap not expensive feed, etc.). In the wine sector there were important 
divisions between the interests of producers, merchants, and consumers, as well as 
opposition from sugar and industrial alcohol producers who, if numerically very small, 
were an important source of taxation for governments.36 
The combination of falling demand and supply volatility caused widespread 
social unrest and increasing demands for state intervention in wine regions during the 
1920s and early 1930s. The characteristics of the sector determined how the state 
responded. Policies that just raised farm prices would simply encourage growers to 
increase output by planting more vines, or increasing yields by using more labour, 
fertilizers, or irrigation. By contrast, schemes to subsidize the grubbing up of surplus 
vineyards, or encouraged producers to shift towards quality (and lower yields), faced 
major difficulties because of limited information available to governments to ensure 
compliance.37 Instead governments tried to move towards a corporatist system, whereby 
in exchange for providing favourable legislation to producers it also delegated the 
monitoring and enforcement of production controls to local growers associations.38 This 
was essentially the system first used in the Midi in 1907 to control product adulteration, 
and it was slowly refined from the 1930s in an attempt to control supply volatility.  
The French government intervened in a number of different areas in an attempt 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36  These differences before 1914 are discussed in Simpson, 2011.  
37  For a discussion of these problems, see Pasour and Rucker, 2005. 





to resolve the problems of overproduction during the 1930s. When wine prices fell 
sharply in 1929 following a very large harvest, an emergency fund of 250 million francs 
was created to purchase alcohol distilled from wine in 1930.39 Major legislation was 
introduced from July 1931 under the Statut de la Viticulture (or Statut du Vin) which, 
among others, prohibited new plantations for ten years (although it added important 
exceptions for small producers); banned the planting of high yielding grape varieties 
(direct –producer hybrid vines), and established a tax system which discriminated 
against large producers and high yielding vineyards. It also introduced compulsory 
blocking of wine after exceptional harvests and when prices fell below cost, for growers 
who producers a minimum of 400 hectolitres (later lowered to 200). The alcohol 
produced from the distillation of blocked wines was bought by the government, a 
measure that was introduced in the legislation after the recommendation of the C.G.V. 
As Warner noted, previously there had been plenty of laws and controls passed, but ‘the 
relative inviolability of the winegrower’s plant and cellars created particular difficulties 
until it was finally breached in 1934.’40 However, while it was relatively easy to monitor 
the small number of large estates, this was not the case with the great majority of 
vineyards, as two-thirds of national production came from those that produced less than 
200 hectolitres.41  
The Statut de la Viticulture failed in its attempt to control new plantations and 
the area of the vineyard increased from 1,517 thousand hectares in 1926-1930 to 1,605 
in 1938 (Figure 2). In part this was the result of its success with its blockage and 
distillation programs. Between 1935 and 1954 an annual average of six million 
hectolitres of wine was compulsory distilled.42 In addition, this policy was reinforced 
with the Statut de l’Alcool in 1935, which reorganized the state alcohol monopoly and 
extended the public purchases of wine alcohol at 2.5 times the price of industrial alcohol 
(made from sugar beet), thereby constituting an additional subsidy to winegrowers.43 
For Warner, both the compulsory distilling and the quota for wine-alcohol 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Warner, 1960, Chapter 7. 
40  Warner, 1960, p.98. 
41  Warner, 1960, p.119. 
42  Warner (1960: cap. 7). 





purchases by the Service des Alcools (the state alcohol monopoly) were the most 
effective part of the Statut de la Viticulture, and winegrowers “now had an assured and 
profitable annual outlet in the Service for the quantity of their wine alcohol roughly 33 
percent greater than their average annual distillation from 1920 through 1930.”44 The 
blockage and distilling of surplus wines was less successful at stabilizing wine markets, 
but they now encouraged the creation of new cooperatives. More storage space for 
surplus wines was needed, and the government offered short-term credit to 
cooperatives, equivalent to 3.7 per cent of the value of national wine output in 1934, to 
store rather than sell surplus wines.45 Some 566 cooperatives (95 per cent of the total) 
received 230 million francs to store surplus production.46 As a consequence, a new 
cooperative movement emerged with almost 500 new cooperatives created in the 1930s, 
half of them in the Midi.47   
While the number of wine cooperatives grew rapidly in France as a consequence 
of market regulation, this failed to happen in Spain, with the numbers increasing only 
marginally from 88 in 1921 to 100 in 1935.48 The weakness of the movement can be 
explained by a combination of the high transaction costs noted above, and the absence 
of a similar government wine policy such as found in France.49 The 1942 law on 
cooperatives granted fiscal exemptions,50 and although numbers reached 193 by 1950, 
most were inoperative because of a lack of capital. In fact, wine cooperatives only 
amounted for 8.5 percent of total production.51  
A new impulse to the cooperative movement occurred in France and Spain 
during the 1950s and 1960s. In France, after wartime shortages, there was a rapid 
recovery of production and a series of abundant harvests in 1950-1956 coincided with a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44  Warner (1960: 121 and 148) 
45  Calculated from INSEE (1958).  
46 Tardy (1935), p.314 
47  Some 229 cooperatives were created in the Midi between 1930 and 1939, Galtier (1958: 338). Number 
of co-operatives increased from 353 in 1927 to 595 in 1933 and 827 in 1939 (For 1927, B’OIV (1929), 
no. 19: 84. For 1933, Tardy (1935: 315) and 1939 Simpson (2000: tabla 5). 
48  Pan-Montojo, 2003: 328 for 1921 and OIV, 1935 for 1935 
49 Fernández, 2008; Galtier, 1958, III: 29, 76 (????). 
50  Bulletin de l’OIV (1954: no. 275: 27; 61) 
51  The lack of financing was initially solved by the long term loans (ten years) granted by the National 
Service for Agricultural Credit from the early 1950s. This loans financed up to 80 per cent of the initial 





decline in consumption leading to surpluses and a price slump reappearing in main wine 
producing areas.  Similar policies to those of the 1930s were now reintroduced in an 
attempt to remove low quality wines from the market, reduce the land under vines, and 
improve wine quality.52 These measures were collected in the Code du Vin of 1953, 
which established taxes on high yields, the compulsory blocking of wines and 
distillation of part of the harvest (10-16%), a subsidy to uproot vines and prohibition on 
planting high yielding varieties.53 These measures were complemented with a new price 
system to regulate the market, with production being divided in quantum, wines that 
could be only sold in markets in fixed quantities and at appointed times during the year, 
and hors-quantum, those that could only be sold in years of poor harvest.54  
The proportion blocked after the harvest was sometimes considerable, reaching 
for around 60-70 percent of production in 1949 and 1951, for instance.55 The elaboration 
of a cadastral survey now allowed the government to offer incentives to growers to 
reduce land under vines, leading to a slow decline in the productive area in France 
during the following decades (Figure 2). The increasing amount of wine blocked 
required an expansion in cellar capacity, leading to a new era of cooperatives. Although 
the numbers increased by only a hundred between 1953 and 1980, the capacity of 
existing cooperatives increased rapidly, so that 50 percent of all French wine was 
produced by cooperatives by 1980. 
In Spain, new wine policies implemented after the sharp drop in prices of 1953 
now led to a rapid growth in cooperatives. As in France, wine regulation to deal with 
over-production was based on the blockage and distillation of part of the harvest. The 
lack of facilities was a problem as the sector was dominated by small producers and 
cooperatives produced only 8.5 percent of wine in the early 1950s. Problems of over-
production were especially important in La Mancha, a region of cheap ordinary wines, 
and that accounted for 25 per cent of the nation’s wine output and more than 500 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52  Bardissa (1976: 42-43).  
53 In 1950-1951 the government had reinstated the tax on high yield producers and the blockage and 
distillation of wines. Warner (1960: 172). 
54  Branas (1957: 84-85), Spahni (1988: 16-22), Barthe (1989: 102-108), Barthe (1975: 8-11), Berger and 
Maurel (1980: 88).  





thousand hectares, but only 10 per cent of its winegrowers had the capacity to store 
wines for any length of time in 1960.56  
In 1953 the Comisión de Compras de Excedentes de Vino (Commission for 
Purchasing Surpluses) was created to stabilize markets by storing and distilling a part of 
the harvest when prices fell below the reference price.57 In 1954, coinciding with a 
major drop in prices, the growers’ lack of wineries obliged the state to open public 
facilities (bodegas de maquila) for growers to make their own wine and to store excess 
production. The government also granted winegrowers in the La Mancha provinces 
(Ciudad Real and Albacete) subsidies, called “advances”, covering the cost of storage, 
and in 1954 and 1955, 61 of these public cellars were opened. However, they processed 
only 32 million kilos of grapes (or 1 per cent of the harvest) and around 16 million 
pesetas (or 3 percent of the value of production in the two provinces) were paid to 
winegrowers.58 
In order to avoid having to finance public cellars, the state encouraged the 
creation of both private and cooperative facilities so that small growers could crush their 
grapes and store wines. The state offered cooperatives long-term loans that covered 
initial capital requirements, as well as short term payments (primas al almacenamiento) 
for the blocking wines after large harvests. The number of cooperatives increased from 
193 in 1950 to 357 in 1955, and 407 in 1957, when they accounted for 25 percent of 
output and membership reached more than 100,000.59 The number of cooperatives that 
benefited from the storage subsidies increased from 19 in 1954 to 232 in 1959, while 
the quantity of wine temporary blocked rose sharply from 127 thousand hectolitres to 
more than 2 million hectolitres, or 10 percent of total production. Some 40 per cent of 
the subsidised storage of wines in 1958-9 was in La Mancha, and while other regions 
producing cheap bulk wines, such as Aragón and Levante, also benefitted (Table 7). In 
1960, half of 600,000 hectolitres of wine removed from the market were from 
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57  Fernández (2008): chapter 4. 
58  Comisión de Compras de Excedentes de Vino (various years). 
59  B’OIV (1960, no. 358: 93), and Pan-Montojo (2003: 328). As a result only nine public facilities were 






Cooperatives received an additional incentive to expand when the Comisión de 
Compras de Excedentes de Vino in 1967 introduced a new subsidy that was equivalent 
to 10 percent of the market wine price to block surpluses in cooperatives and private 
cellars.61 Cooperative benefitted from a combination of cheap long term loans to build 
and equip facilities, state subsidies, which during the 1960s accounted for 10 percent of 
the value of production,62 as well as advances granted until members could sell their 
blocked wines. As a result cooperatives increased rapidly to 789 in 1969, of which 197 
or 35 per cent were in La Mancha. Membership per cooperative also rose from 207 
growers in 1954 to 274 in 1969, while the storage capacity increased to 20 million 
hectolitres. As a result, the quantity of wine produced in cooperatives amounted to 12.5 
million hectolitres in 1969, or 50 per cent of total production (Table 2).  
This policy of market regulation through blocking surplus wines in cooperatives 
helped stabilize wine markets. Figure 3 shows that price volatility in La Mancha by the 
early 1960s was sharply reduced from the beginning compared to the late nineteenth 
century when no cooperatives existed.  The standard deviation suggests volatility 
reached 8 per cent in 1874-1892 compared to 5 per cent in 1953-1972. However, during 
the period of rapid growth in cooperatives, the standard deviation decreased from 7 per 
cent in 1953-1960, a similar rate to the late 1800s, to only 3.6 per cent in 1961-1972 
In conclusion policies that involved government intervention to remove surplus 
wines from the market through storage and distillation encouraged cooperatives in both 
France and Spain. In France, the same was also true of governmental intervention in the 
wheat sector when, after surpluses appeared following the abundant harvests of 1932 
and 1933, the government began a policy to encourage farm storage, leading to the 
number of wheat co-operatives reaching 1,100 in 1939, and accounting for 85 percent of  
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61  AGA (Sindicatos. SIG35/65): Normas de regulación de campañas.This measure aimed at avoiding the 
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output.63   
In contrast with the remarkable expansion in France and Spain, producer wine 
cooperatives were much less important in Italy, a fact which can be explained by the 
limited intervention and incentives provided by the government. Although the Fanfani 
Law of 1952 gave cheap loans to Italian winegrowers covering up to 75 percent of 
capital requirements numbers increased only slowly, 64 from little more than 200 
cooperatives accounting for only six percent of production in 1955, to around 600 by 
1969. These produced only 18 percent of Italian wines, much less than the 50 percent 
production found in Spain’s and France’s cooperatives (Tables 1 and 2).65 While wine 
policy in Italy was limited to granting tax advantages to distilling and restricting 
imports,66 surpluses were less, in part because of the expanding external markets for its 
wines (Table 5). 
Wine policy of the European Economic Community, the world largest producer 
and consumer, started in the early 1970s and was influenced by the French tradition of 
regulation. Policy, financed by the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee 
Fund, aimed to “adjust supply to demand and to raise quality standards”. At the same 
time, the EEC tried to guarantee farm incomes through market intervention.67 In 1970, it 
defined two prices for table wines: a guide price (considered as being adequate for the 
producer) and a threshold price (below which intervention measures came into play). 
Besides a common tariff on imports and controls of new plantings, attempts were made 
to stabilize prices by granting subsidies for the short and long-term blockage of wines 
and, in the case of serious imbalances between supply and demand, measures “to 
encourage voluntary distillation of the surpluses”.68 In Italy, the introduction of French 
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65  For 1955, Bulletin l’OIV (1956): no. 299; for 1969, tables 1 and 2. 
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style intervention into its wine markets from the 1970s through the European Common 
Wine Policy led to a rapid expansion in the number of cooperatives, reaching almost 
800 and accounting for 38 per cent of production in 1980  (Tables 1 and 2). 
 
4. Cooperatives and the problems of low quality wines 
The combination of effective controls on the area of vines cultivated and their 
yields, together with the  blocking and distilling of surpluses by cooperatives following 
large harvests might have given the industry long term stability if demand conditions 
had not changed so dramatically. As Table 4 shows, per capita consumption fell by 45 
per cent in France between 1955/59 and 1985/9, 34 percent in Italy, and 17 percent in 
Spain. The greatest decline occurred with cheap table wines, the market segment 
dominated by the cooperatives rather than better quality premium wines.69 Rising 
exports could only partly offset falling domestic consumption in European producer 
countries (Table 5). In these changing market conditions, traditional cooperatives, 
which had developed as specialized institutions to process large quantities of poor 
quality grapes which were then sold in bulk to merchants for blending, were 
increasingly unsuitable to the new conditions.  
The success of market intervention in protecting the incomes of low quality wine 
producers encouraged them to increase output, and in both Spain and Italy the area 
under vines continued to expand during the 1940s and 1950s (Figure 2). In Spain, the 
lack of a cadastre made it difficult to control plantings, explaining perhaps the absence 
of government subsidies to uproot vines or tax more heavily poor quality vines.70 In 
particular, the area of vines in La Mancha expanded to reach 50 percent of the national 
wine area (table 9 rehacer), while at the same time yields substantially increased. By 
contrast, in France the cadastre allowed the state to monitor closely the land under vines 
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and therefore offer economic incentives to uproot vines.71 The result was a sharp fall in 
the area of vines, with 200.000 hectares disappearing every 10 years after the mid-
1950s, and in the Midi, the decline was especially significant, falling by a third between 
1950 and 1980 (Table 9). However, this region still accounted for 42 per cent of French 
domestic production in the 1980s, not so different to the 50 per cent of Spanish output 
originating from La Mancha.72 
In response to changing consumption patterns, governments have encouraged 
the spread of appellations to new regions, including areas dominated by cooperatives 
producing poor quality wines. In exchange for help provided by governments to create a 
collective brand which would compensate growers with higher farm prices, they had to 
adapt to markets by installing new wine-making technologies and, in particular, 
restrictions on grape varieties and yields, thereby improving quality and reducing 
volume.  
The response of cooperatives has been mixed. The possibilities of adapting to 
new market conditions for a small cooperative producing 10,000 hectolitres in a 
favourably location such as Bordeaux was very different to one producing ten or twenty 
times more in the Midi. Instead, growers resorted from time to time with ‘voice’, 
perpetuating the militant tradition of the South. Only with the turn of the new century 
have there been major attempts to move-up market, with the considerable new 
investment in facilities for maturing wines, bottling plants and brand creation that this 
required.  
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Producer cooperatives became increasing important in European farming during 
the half century prior to the Second World War. However there were significant 
differences in their success, both across countries and farm products. This paper has 
argued that important barriers existed to their diffusion in the wine industry. There were 
potentially significant advantages to be gained from the economies of scale in crushing 
grapes, and the maturing and selling of wines, leading not just to cost savings, but also 
better product quality. However the diffusion of cooperatives was slow, in part because 
of the significant capital costs in creating modern wineries, but also because of the high 
transaction cost in measuring grape quality.  
European cooperatives were far too small to set market prices for wine, but in 
both California and Mendoza production scale was much greater, and cartels were 
formed with the object of restricting output and raising prices. The success of the 
California Wine Association in particular encouraged some producers in the Midi to 
float similar ideas in the 1900s, but the quantity of wine required to control prices was 
far too great. With the 1930s Depression however, governments everywhere were 
forced to consider the possibilities of market intervention. 
The wine cooperatives that appeared in France in the 1930s, and the rest of 
Europe after the Second World War, were very different to the earlier ones. Instead of 
‘bottom up’ institutions, that represented a small number of producers who attempted to 
benefit from the economies of scale in wine-making and marketing, they now formed 
part of a government plan to regulate output in the sector, and avoid the periodic crisis 
of over production and price slumps. In this respect they resembled the California Wine 
Association and the Midi producers’ attempts to corner the market at the turn of the 
century, although now being organized and financed directly by the state. First in 
France in the early 1930s and then in Spain in the 1950s a reference price was 
established below which the state started to withdraw surpluses from the market through 
compulsory blockages or distillation. To be successful, market regulation needed an 





quality wines and lacked capital to invest increase the size of their cellars, encouraging 
the state to finance new co-operatives and increase the size of those already working.  
As a result, the presence of cooperatives became an integral, rather than 
peripheral part of the organisation of the wine market. By 1951, 13 per cent of the 
French winegrowers belonged to 986 cooperatives, and their production accounted for 
more than 14 million hectoliters, or 27 per cent of the national total. 73  Numbers peaked 
at almost 1200 in 1970 (and 45 per cent of the harvest), although the amount of 
cooperative wine continued to increase to reach 52 per cent of the total by 2000. In 
Spain growth was even faster, with slightly less than 200 cooperatives accounting for 
under 10 per cent of the harvest as late as 1950, rising to almost 900 and half the 
nation’s wine by 1970; and 715 cooperatives responsible for 70 per cent of output by 
2000. 
By stabilizing short term wine prices by financing the storage and distillation of 
surplus wines in years of low prices, the state effectively provided an insurance cover 
for cooperative members. These policies were especially important in regions producing 
cheap wines, such as the Midi or La Mancha, where price falls were greatest because 
many growers lacked storage facilities, and were forced to sell their wine immediately 
after it was fermented. However, the very success of the policy created major 
difficulties for the wine market to adapt to changes in consumer demand, especially 
from the 1980s. As a result, cooperatives remained, in the eyes of the consumer, 
synonymous with cheap, poor quality wines.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  







Estimated number of wine cooperatives in France, Italy and Spain, 1914-1980 
 France Spain Italy 
1908 13   
1920 (1) 92 88 80 
1928 (2) 353  84 
1933 (3) 595  128 
1945 858   
1950 (4) 997 193 161 
1953 1,036 263 208 
1957 (5) 1,109 407 214 
1969 1,202 782 624 
1980 (6) 1,158 848 783 
2000   870 715 607 
 
Notes: (1) For Spain, it refers to 1921; for Italy, it refers to 1924; (2) For France it refers 
to 1927; (3) For Italy, it refers to 1932; (4) For Italy and France, it refers to 1951; (5) 
For Italy, it refers to 1955; (6) For Spain, it refers to 1981-2 
Sources: 
France: 1908 and 1920, Loubère (1990: 139); 1928???; 1933, Tardy (1935: 315); 1945 
and 1951, Loubère (1990: 147); 1953-1962, Barthe (1966: 36); 1964-1979, ONIVINS 
(1992); 1980, 1983 and 1985, Loubère (1990: 147); 2000, Anderson and Norman (2004: 
Table 2.2). 
Italy: 1928, (Cotta, 1935: 71); number of cooperatives, from Cotta (1935: 71), Simpson 
(2000: 110), Galtier (1958, III: 29); 1955 bulletin l’OIV (1956): no. 299: pp. ; Anderson 
and Norman (2004: Table 2.2). Other years: Annuario Statistico Italiano 
Spain: 1921, Pan-Montojo (2003: 328); 1935, OIV (1935); 1950, UNACO (1961: 25); 
1953, LSV (1978), no. 1657; 1957, Pan-Montojo (2003: 328); 1961, UNACO (1961: 
25); 1966, AGA (Sindicatos. SIG 36/6938); 1969, AGA (Sindicatos, SIG35/40): Datos 





Anderson and Norman (2004: Table 2.2). 
Table 2 
Quantity of wine produced by cooperatives (% of total) 
 France Spain Italy 
1920 (1)  5  
1928 (2)   6 
1945 25   
1950 (4) 27 9  
1953 26 13  
1957 (5) 35 25 6 
1969 45 50 18 
1980 (6) 49 63 38 
2000 52 70 55 
Source: see previous table 
 
Table 3 
Private cooperatives and market power 




Relatively few producers No Yes 
Product quality homogenous No Yes 
New entry difficult No No 
Commodity perishable No No 
Prices recover with small production 
cuts 
No Yes 












Per capita wine consumption in selected countries (litres) 
 France Italy Spain 
1900-1913 145 120 95 
1920-1929 164 95 92 
1930-1939 160 90 70 
1945-1948 90 75 65 
1950-1954 126 87 50 
1955-1959 137 106 56 
1960-1964 125 108 59 
1965-1969 116 110 62 
1970-1974 106 106 68 
1975-1979 99 96 69 
1980-1984 87 87 56 
1985-1989 76 70 46 
Sources: own elaboration from Pinilla and Ayuda (2002a: 68), OIV (1954: 282), La 




















Wine Exports between 1880 and 1985, thousand hectolitres 
 Italy Spain France 
1870-9 452 2,198 3,144 
1880-9 2,101 7,454 2,525 
1890-9 1,957 6,536 1,822 
1900-9 1,372 2,073 2,084 
1910-9 1,454 3,488 1,362 
1920-9 1,151 3,519 1,569 
1930-9 1,267 1,323 905 
1940-9 995 546 1,003 
1950-9 1,435 1,273 2,178 
1960-9 2,512 2,517 4,981 
1970-9 12,414 5,803 6,987 
1980-5 17,825 7,180 10,383 




Wine Output between 1880 and 1985, thousand hectoliters 
 Italy Spain France 
1870-9 26,650  51,690 
1880-9 31,192  29,670 
1890-9 31,240 18,165 35,980 
1900-9 44,524 17,680 55,650 
1910-9 43,409 17,481 43,120 
1920-9 45,534 23,333 59,920 
1930-9 39,971 19,594 58,780 
1940-9 35,718 17,525 41,660 





1960-9 64,302 25,521 60,150 
1970-9 70,410 30,896 66,500 




Storage of surplus wines in cooperatives in Spain, in 1954-1959 
 Number 
of coop. 
Wine Stored Advance granted 












1954-55 19 127 1 100 10 0.2 
1955-56 73 567 3 82 43 0.7 
1956-57 124 1.073 5 46 80 1.3 
1957-58 165 1.082 6 45 81 0.8 
1958-59 232 2.082 10 41 208 2.8 
Source: Comisión de Compras de Excedentes de Vino (various years). 
 
Table 8 
Spain’s cooperatives by main producing regions 
 1946-7 1954 1969 
Mancha 13 58 197 
Cataluña-Baleares 75 108 173 
Levante 22 47 119 
Aragón 1 8 60 
Navarra, Rioja  31 79 102 
Andalucía 
Occidental 
6 6 36 
Otras 6 18 95 






Source: see tables 1 and 2 
 
Table 9 
Vineyard land in the Midi and La Mancha, 1950-1987 









1950-1959 512 100 523 100 
1960-1969 436 85 611 117 
1970-1979 430 84 713 136 
1980-1987 393 77 770 147 
Source: own calculations from Lachiver (1988) and Anuario estadístico de las 






































Area under vines in France, Italy and Spain in 1890-1985 (in thousand hectares) 
 
 Figure 3 
Monthly price change in La Mancha region in 1874-1892 and 1953-1971 
 
Source: own calculations from GEHR (1981) and La Semana Vitivinícola (various 
years) 
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